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NOTES

The trustee performed no acts which would bear the same relationship to
the agreement as the solicitation of insurance in the McGee case. Florida
had no "manifest interest" in providing redress for its citizens under these
circumstances. (The Court cited the police power cases.) The application
of the substantial connection rule "will vary with the quality and nature
of the defendants activity. It is essential that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state."
All of the ramifications of the McGee doctrine have not been evolved.
However , a logical conclusion appears that the Supreme Court has discarded the traditional tests for state jurisdiction in an attempt to establish
a doctrine which can be applied to the various circumstances which arise
in our expanding national economy and interstate business. The McGee
doctrine is very general so that it may be applied under a variety of circumstances. Yet, as illustrated by Hanson v. Denckla,2 3 it contains language
which may limit its application in other situations where the demands
of due process so require.
BOB R. BULLOCK

ELIMINATION OF PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS
IN A WYOMING CORPORATION
Under the common-law doctrine of preemptive rights, shareholders
have a right or option to subscribe for newly authorized issues of shares
before they are offered to the public. This right allows the shareholders
to subscribe to the newly authorized issue of shares in proportion to their
present holdings, and it is intended to safeguard the shareholders against
unfairness and dilution of their interest and voting power. The right has
been made subject to various exceptions on grounds of practical convenience.
Ballantine claims the right aims to safeguard shareholders against
unfairness in the issues of shares, particularly against two possible wrongs:'
(1) the manipulation of voting control of the corporation
by the issue of shares to some one shareholder or group to the
exclusion of others, and
(2) the issue of shares at an inadequate price to favored
persons, thereby diluting the proportionate interest of other
shareholders.
The various exceptions based on grounds of practical convenience as
recognized by some courts are shares previously authorized, as distinguished
23.

1.

Ibid.

Ballantine, Corporations, P. 487 (rev. ed. 1946).
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from shares newly authorized, 2 treasury shares, 3 shares for which it is proposed that the corporation receive consideration other than cash, 4 shares
5
used to satisfy conversion or option rights granted by the corporation,
6
and shares used to effect a merger or consolidation.
The one instance in which the preemptive right is almost universally
recognized is in an issue of newly authorized stock which is being sold for
But, even under these circumstances, non-recognition may be
cash. 7
desirable. Modern corporations must have the ability to raise large sums
on short notice in order to successfully carry out expansion programs. The
directors cannot float large issues on favorable terms if their freedom of
action is hampered by the presence of the preemptive right.s For example,
consider the failure of a Pure Oil Company stock issue brought about by
the delay and uncertainty necessarily incident to the exercise of the preemptive right on the part of stockholders. 9 And consider, Verner v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company,' 0 involving an underwriting,
where the court stated:
When to the time needed for permitting the exercise of the preemptive right must be added the twenty day "cooling period"
required by the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77h), the
magnitude of the problem is increased proportionately.
Directors will simply be prevented from securing and underwriting on
favorable terms, especially during periods of market fluctuations, because
the underwriters will hesitate to contract when the preemptive right must
be recognized.
Another instance in which recognition of the preemptive right may
defeat the exercise of a desirable plan is in the case of stock options. A
corporation may wish to grant valuable employees an option to purchase
stock. The usual purpose for making such an offer is to induce these
valuable employees to remain in the employ of the corporation. Otherwise, these employees may leave for higher salaries offered by competing
corporations.
To justify recognition of the doctrine of preemptive rights, the rule
must be flexible so as to meet modern day needs of corporations. There
was no need for flexibility in the period in which the doctrine of pre2.
3.

Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930).
Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
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Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941).
Venner v. American Telegraph & Telephone Co., 100 Misc. 118, 181 N.Y.Supp. 45
(Sup.Ct. 1920), aff'd, 196 App.Div. 960, 188 N.Y.Supp. 956 (1st Dept. 1921).
Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co., 158 Md. 352, 148 Atd. 234 (1930).
Stevens, Corporations, § 111 (2d ed. 1949).
See Note 65, Harv. L. Rev. 507, 508 (1951).
The Investment Banker, 1939, Fortune Mag., Sept. 1939, 78, at 110; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 1937, p. 36, col. 1, Sept. 7, 1937, p. 32, col. 2, Sept. 28, 1937, p. 38, col. 4,
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Oct. 23, 1937, p. 27, col. 8 Dec. 8, 1937, p. 42. col. 2 (tracing the failure of a Pure
Oil Co. stock issue because of the existence of preemptive rights).
Supra note 5.
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emptive rights arose in the United States. The first American case invoking
the doctrine was Gray v. Portland Bank." In that case, the doctrine was
capable of rational application because the corporation had only one class
of stock. Where there is but one class of stock, the extent which present
shareholders' interests would be affected in a new issue if offered to outsiders is obvious. With the utilization of complex capital structures now
in vogue, the extent of the right is difficult to define.
Aside from this problem of time, there are other difficulties raised by
the preemptive right. Mr. Frey has illustrated the problem presented by
the great number of combinations possible with three or four classes of
preferred shares, some voting, some not, some convertible into one class
of securities, others into another, some redeemable at one rate, others at
another, with different rates of preferred dividends, and different rights
to participate in surplus earnings; after that classes of lettered common
shares, of par and of no par value and with all sorts of ingenious attributes;
and finally with bonds or debentures convertible on various contingencies
into still different classes of shares. 12 An issue under one of these combinations will necessarily affect the interests of shareholders of another class.
13
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be issued to the complainant sufficient to preserve his proportionate
interest. Such a solution, although theoretically possible, is impractical
because underwriters will not be willing to underwrite such an issue.
Many states have recognized the need for flexibility and attempt to
4
provide for it by statute. For example, Delaware' and New York 15
provide that the preemptive right shall exist unless limited or denied by
the corporate charter; California 16 provides that the preemptive right shall7
not exist unless it is expressly provided for in the charter; Michigan'
provides that the preemptive right may exist if provided for in the articles;
9
Pennsylvania 8 codifies the preemptive right; New Jersey' provides it may
be abolished only by two-thirds vote of each class of stockholders in interest
and Maryland 2° provides the preemptive right may be "defined, limited
or denied."
Unfortunately, there is no mention of preemptive right in Wyoming
11.
12.
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14.
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3 Mass. 364 (1807).
Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 Yale L.J. 563, 566
152 App.Div. 136, 136 N.Y.Supp. 602 (1912).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 157 (1953).
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 39 (1941).
Cal. Corp. Code § 1106 (1955).
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.31 (Supp. 1955).
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 137 (1938).
Rev. Stat. of N.J., Vol. 1, 14:8-17 (1937).
Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 26 (1951).

(1929).
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statutes. 2' Consideration of a few cases from other jurisdictions may
provide some guidance as to whether the preemptive right could be eliminated in a Wyoming corporation.
The obvious method for eliminating the right is to do so by charter
provision. The only direct authority is an early Indiana case.2 2 The
charter of the corporation provided that the directors shall have the power
to increase the stock of said company to a given limit, on such terms and
conditions, and in such manner, as to them shall deem best. It provided
further that the existing stockholders shall have no exclusive right to take
the increased stock in amounts proportionate to the several amounts of the
original stock held by them. This provision was inserted in the charter
in the absence of Indiana statute specifically authorizing such a provision.
Even in the absence of statute, the court gave effect to the provision. Prof.
O'Neal, in his article on Molding the Corporate Form,28 states that most
courts could give effect to such an optional charter provision even in the
absence of statute.
But, Prof. O'Neal further points out that Wyoming is a state which
has no statutory authorization for the use of optional charter provisions,
and he continues on to say that in the absence of statutory authorization
it is doubtful whether inserted optional provisions would be given effect if
challenged. The reason is that the specific enumeration by the statute of
the contents of the charter necessarily implies the exclusion of other
items. 2 4 It therefore seems doubtful that such an optional charter provision permitting elimination of preemptive rights would be recognized
25
in Wyoming.
The preemptive right could not be eliminated by amendment of the
articles of incorporation even if such a charter provision would be valid
if originally included. A Wyoming corporation has no general amending
power, and the preemptive right could not therefore be eliminated by
charter amendment. The same result might be achieved, however, by
organizing a new Wyoming corporation and merging the old into the new,
thereby acquiring the desired original charter provision. This method of
eliminating preemptive rights in Wyoming corporations would be supported by a Maryland case 2 6 in which a shareholder's preemptive right was
cut off in a consolidation. In the new corporation, there was no provision
for recognition of the preemptive right. The court stated that the consolidation of the old corporations ended their existence and vested their
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 28-125 (1931) provided that holders of common stock should
have the first opportunity to purchase newly issued preferred stock in proportion
to their holdings of common stock. That section 28-125, Revised Statutes of
Wyoming, 1931, was repealed. [L. '39, ch. 62, §9]. Effective Feburary 17, 1939.
Ohio Ins. Co. v. Nunnemacher, 15 Ind. 294 (1860).
O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional
Charter Clauses, 10 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1 (1957).
Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. 1, 9 S.Ct. 409, 32 L.Ed. 837
(1888).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 44-101 (1945) is an enumerative type statute.
Thom v. Baltimore Trust Co., 158 Md. 253, 148 Atl. 234 (1930).
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property and powers in the new corporation; and where the shareholder's
right to purchase a proportion of a new issue of stock could be traced to
the charter of only one of the consolidated corporations, or was subject
in one to a special limitation, it did not surive the consolidation.
A similar Delaware case 27 held that under the general amending power
granted by statute, the preemptive right is not a "vested" right and thus
may be terminated by amendment of the certificate of incorporation. The
court construed the wording of the Delaware statute which authorized
changing "other special rights" of the shares as authority to terminate the
preemptive right by amendment. A New York case, 28 however, allowed
the amendment eliminating the preemptive right only as to the shareholders
who voted for the amendent. The court said that the amendment could not bind a shareholder who opposed its adoption. It would
seem at least possible that the New York rule might be extended to protect
shareholders who dissent from the merger proposed as a device for eliminating preemptive rights, and it therefore raises serious doubts as to the
effectiveness of that method.
The only reasonably safe method for securing an elimination is therefore a rather drastic one: a Wyoming corporation could probably reorganize
in another state and eliminate the preemptive right without risk of
liability to shareholders later asserting a preemptive right based on the
provisions of the defunct Wyoming charter.
Recent legislation 2 9 of various states indicate that their legislators
recognized the desirability of providing statutory authority for flexibility
in the recognition of the preemptive right. Writers 0 and judges3 1 have
encouraged the trend. It is submitted that the protection which the preemptive right allegedly affords is adequately afforded by the directors
in exercising their fiduciary duty not to use their positions for their own
personal advantage, or to discriminate between shareholders, or to cause
stock to be issued so as to make a profit for themselves or to obtain control
of the corporation. When this duty is exercised, the advantages to the
corporation will redound to the shareholders as a whole, and will offset
any theoretical detriment resulting from the dilution of their voting
strength in an issue of stock for its fair value.
Wyoming legislators should follow the course of the legislators of
other states who have enacted appropriate legislation dealing with the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 32 D.Ch. 23, 83 A.2d 595 (1951) rev'd on other
grounds.
Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastic Inc., 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.Supp.2d
415 (4th Dept. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 280 N.Y. 840, 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939).
See notes 14 through 22 supra.
Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 586 (1930).
Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533, 538-539 (D.R.I. 1929).
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preemptive right. The Model Business Corporation Act 2 § 24 on Share3
holders' Preemptive Rights may well serve as their guide.
JERRY M. MURRAY

A REVIEW OF PRESENT LAW ON THE ADMISSION
OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN OUR
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

There exists today, among state and federal courts, a divergence of
opinion as to the admissibility of evidence illegally1 obtained by state and
federal officials.
Illegally obtained evidence which is admissible in certain state courts
is inadmissible in others, and in our federal courts. Yet, evidence which is
inadmissible in a state court sometimes may be admissible in a federal
prosecution. The object of this article is to review the status of the law
as it now stands.
II.

ADMISSIBILITY

IN FEDERAL COURTS OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED BY FEDERAL OFFICERS

It is a well-settled general rule today that evidence illegally obtained
by federal officers is inadmissible in the federal courts.2 This so-called
"Exclusionary Rule" excludes any evidence obtained by unlawful search,
and also the oral evidence concerning what was found or seized while
the unlawful search was being conducted, together with the evidence
developed as a result.
There are different theoretical bases for the exclusion in federal courts
of illegally obtained evidence. Some courts appear to rely directly on the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 3 Other courts take the position
32.

Model Business Corporation Act, American Law Institute § 24 (1953).
"The
preemptive right of a shareholder to acquire unissued or treasury shares of a
corporation may be limited or denied to the extent provided in the articles of
incorporation.
Unless otherwise provided by its articles of incorporation, any corporation may
issue and sell its shares to its officers or employees or to the officers of employees
of any subsidiary corporation without first offering such shares to its shareholders,
for such consideration and upon such terms and conditions as shall be approved
by the holders of two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote thereon or by its board
of directors pursuant to like approval of the shareholders." See also, § 53, clause p,
for the right to amend articles to "limit, deny, or grant" preemptive rights.

1.

"Illegal" is used in this article to include any act prohibited by the federal or
state constitutions or any state or federal statutes.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1888); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34
S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ; a review of the
history of the Fourth Amendment will show that the founders of our nation felt
very strongly about the English practice of searching by writs of assistance. For
a discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment, see Boyd v. United States,
supra note 2.
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